

TERRORISM AND TOURISM

Original scientific paper

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Summary

Terrorism has had major effects on the tourism industry because of media amplification of terrorist acts. In the modern socially constructed world, the media have a strong influence on risk perception among tourists and consequently a strong influence on the tourism industry. In that context, the way that a terrorist act is presented in the mass media will shape the perceptions of potential tourists to certain tourist destinations, countries and whole regions and therefore influence the tourism industry. After serious terrorist acts and their aftermath, tourism crisis managers in the tourism industry must employ creative and skillful crisis communication to restore the image of stability in tourist destinations affected by terrorist attacks.

Keywords

terrorism, tourism, crisis, media, crisis communication

The global rise of the tourism industry

It is obvious that tourism has become a popular global leisure activity. Different factors like human curiosity, the need to learn about other countries and cultures, and modern transportation with its cheap air travel and package tours have resulted in the booming development of international mass tourism. In 2008, there were more than 922 million international tourist arrivals, with a growth of 1.9% compared to 2007. International tourism receipts grew to US\$ 944 billion in 2008, an increase of 1.8%. The World Tourism Organization forecasts that international tourism will continue growing at an average annual rate of 4%. It estimates that, by 2020, Europe will remain the most popular destination, but that its share will drop from 60% in 1995 to 46%. Long-haul travel will grow at a slightly faster rate than intraregional travel and, by 2020, its share will increase from 18% in 1995 to 24% (UNWTO, 2009).

Safety and security are among the major concerns that tourists have when choosing their destinations. Adversities like wars and ethnic conflicts, terrorism, high crime rates, dangerous diseases and natural disasters can deter tourists from choosing particular destinations. In almost all tourist guides, there are safety tips

advising readers to avoid certain countries, regions, neighborhoods or behaviors. Also, there are numerous web sites like www.SOS.travel, an online one-stop-shop where users can access the latest critical information and communication tools in anticipation of, or in response to, natural and man-made crises with potential impacts on tourism. The system aims to support crisis preparedness in the tourism sector and to assist in rapid recovery from crisis situations. SOS.travel also serves as a valuable resource for travelers by providing, in one place, the tools and information that they need in order to make informed decisions about their own safety and security and to obtain assistance in case of an emergency.

The tourism sector generally, and popular destinations in particular, are inherently vulnerable to disaster and crisis conditions (Pizam and Mansfield, 1996; Sömnez et al., 1999). Adverse situations associated with distress, fear, anxiety, trauma and panic are the antithesis to the enjoyment, pleasure, relaxation and stability often sought in the tourist experience (Santana, 2003). If a prospective destination is associated with any negative images or sentiments, consumers can simply choose to cancel, defer or substitute for alternative locations, and such actions can precipitate a tourism crisis.

There is evidence documenting the existence of thrill seeking tourists and related phenomena like war tourism,¹ extreme (shock) tourism² and adventure tourism (Buckley, 2006). Even these types of tourists are concerned with their own safety, and they tend to rely upon specialized tourist guides for guidance on how to stay alive in world's most dangerous places (Pelton, 2003).

¹**War tourism** is a term that the media use to describe recreational travel to war zones for the purposes of sightseeing and superficial voyeurism. War tourist is also a pejorative term to describe thrill seeking in dangerous and forbidden places. The concept of war tourism has gained currency in a number of media reports, none of which identification of or an interview with an individual who has visited active combat areas as a tourist. There have been a number of tourists caught up in war torn regions, and many tourists visit active war zones like Israel, Lebanon, Myanmar, Algeria, and Colombia. There are freelance journalists who describe themselves humorously as "war tourists" (P.J. O'Rourke is the most famous) and mercenaries who have pretended to be tourists to avoid discovery, as in Michael Hoare's attempt to take over the Seychelles disguised as "The Royal Order of Frothblowers." See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_tourism. War tourism is sometimes confused with "dark tourism" or "battlefield tourism," which involve going to places of historic importance or famous battle sites. Foley and Lennon have explored the idea that people are attracted to regions and sites where "inhuman acts" have occurred. They claim that this attraction has been driven by media coverage and a desire to see for themselves and that there is a symbiotic relationship between the attraction, like a death camp or the site of a celebrity's death, and the visitor. Much of their focus has been on ancient sites where "acts of inhumanity are celebrated as heritage sites in Britain (for example, the Tower of London, Edinburgh Castle), and the Berlin Wall" (Foley and Lennon, 2000; Sharpley and Stone, 2009).

²**Extreme tourism** or **shock tourism** is a type of niche tourism involving travel to dangerous places (mountains, jungles, deserts, caves, etc.) or participation in dangerous events. Extreme tourism overlaps with extreme sports. The two share the same main attraction: the "adrenaline rush" caused by an element of risk, and differ mostly in the degree of engagement and professionalism involved. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extreme_tourism.

More importantly, thrill and danger seekers are not mainstream tourists. For the majority of tourists, the safety of their lives and property is an important factor when choosing where to spend their holidays. Different levels of concern for safety may influence the decisionmaking process of potential tourists. It is likely that destinations that are perceived as safe from terrorism and political problems will be considered seriously, while those perceived as risky will be rejected. As a result, in recent decades, different parts of the world tourism industry have been affected by acts of terror, wars and political crises. Pizam and Smith have noted that, since before the end of the Cold War, terrorist acts have had major effects on tourist destinations. As a result, the "shadowy, mobile, and unpredictable" forces of terrorism are becoming an unfortunate part of the travel and tourism landscape. Their article provides a quantitative analysis of major terrorism events around the world from 1985 - 98, classified by date, location, victims, weapons used, severity of damage, motive, effect on tourism, and length of the effect. The analysis is followed by a summary and conclusions about the magnitude of the impact of these events on host destinations and the tourism industry worldwide (Pizam and Smith, 2000).

Aiming to gain publicity, terrorist acts are often very brutal. When the electronic and print media present large numbers of innocent randomly chosen victims, the result is a rise in the fear of crime and anxiety over personal security. Freyer and Schröder have noted:


[A]gain and again the peaceful picture of traveling has shown signs of faltering in the face of unexpected events such as terrorist attacks. In the affected regions, events of this nature often have enormous impacts on the economy and social life of residents. In some cases, tourism flows are interrupted as tourists look for other seemingly safe destinations. However, up to now, terrorist attacks at Luxor, Cairo and Bali, the PKK attack in Turkey or the ETA attacks in Spain have not stopped the long-term growth of international tourism. The destinations subjected to terrorist attacks have generally regained lost visitors as holiday-makers quickly forget such incidents and return relatively soon after the occurrences of devastating attacks (Freyer and Schröder, 2005).

Because of the number of victims and the method and target of the assault, the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States were a world media event par excellence. Although the attack itself was not primarily aimed at tourists, its effect on the international tourism economy, the idea of tourism and tourists themselves was considerable (Nacos, 2002; Schicha and Brosda, 2002). The media amplified the fear of terrorism in order to shape public opinion and justify the "war on terror" and the subsequent intervention in Iraq, as well as new domestic security policies involving restrictions on human rights and freedoms. The impact on air transportation and the tourism industry was an unintended consequence.

Symbiosis of Terrorism and media

Generally, terrorists use extremely violent and inhumane methods against soft targets in order to generate shock, fear and fright. Their goal is to reach a very broad audience, and the media seem to be the best means achieve it. Regardless of the cruelty of a terrorist act, if it reaches a limited public audience, its effect is minor. Modern terrorism has evolved through its interaction with the modern mass media. A number of authors have pointed out the instrumental relationship that exists between the media and terrorists (Laqueur, 1976; Jenkins, 1983; Nacos, 1994; Wiewiorka, 1988; Kratcoski, 2001), although there is no consensus about the nature of this relationship.

The communication dimension of terrorism was first proposed by Karber, who has argued that "as a symbolic act, terrorism can be analyzed much like other mediums of communication" (Karber, 1971:9). He has outlined four basic components of the communication process within the context of terrorism: the transmitter of message (the terrorist), the intended recipient of the message (the target), the message (a terrorist act involving individual or institutional victims), and feedback (the reaction of the recipient). In this terrorism context, the classic communications paradigm can be slightly rearranged.



This symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media first became possible with the development of the international media. Their development occurred in several stages. In 1830, the first steam printing press was developed. Three years later, the first large-circulation newspaper was published in the United States. In

1968, the first satellite television images were broadcast worldwide, followed later by live reporting. Terrorist organizations quickly recognized the potential to promote their aims through this new means of mass communication, and it is perhaps no coincidence that the 1968 hijacking of a commercial jet by Palestinian terrorists announced the birth of international terrorism (Hoffman, 1999).

Today, it is obvious that the media plays an important role in terrorists' planning and execution of terrorist activities (Biernatzki, 2002). The media transmit the events to a broad audience and further the ideological aims of the terrorists by means of far-reaching and extensive reporting. Without media amplification, terrorists activities would fade away and the perception of the events would be limited to the immediate victims. To attract the attention of the local as well as international media, their actions are often carefully planned. News content is of great importance to the media, which in turn reach a broad, interested audience. The intensive, sometimes exaggerated and superficial reporting results in an image of unsafe destinations and leads to negative effects not only for the target destinations, but also for those countries that benefit from tourism (Freyer and Schröder, 2007).

Terrorism, tourism and risk perception

Today, both terrorism and tourism are global phenomena. Tourists and tourist destinations have become favorite terrorist targets. Due to the number of terrorist attacks on tourist destinations, the peaceful picture of travel is fading away. People still remember incidents like the explosion that killed three people in Paris in 1986, the home-made pipe bomb in Tel Aviv in 1990, the November 1997 massacre of 58 tourists at Luxor's Temple of Hatshepsut in Egypt, and the truck bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 263 people in August 1998 (Pizam and Smith, 2000). Because of their scope, the number of victims, the method and target of the assault and the media attention, the 9/11 attacks were, to an extent, a milestone in understanding and redefining the strong links and complex mutual impacts that exist between tourism and terrorism.

On a daily tactical level, terrorists use thefts from and robberies of tourists to obtain resources to fund further activities. At a more global strategic level, attacking tourist targets furthers the ideological aims of destabilizing target countries' economies and/or the power and status of their political elite by intimidating potential visitors (Sönmez et al., 1999). Terrorist organizations also use attacks on tourist destinations as a form of symbolic "punishment" for the business community, political system and elements of society for their support of unpopular economic and social policies. The impact of targeting tourist destinations is deeper in those countries that are dependent upon tourism and, therefore, where the state is more likely to be susceptible to blackmail by the threat of future terrorist action. In this way, tourism is a surrogate; the terrorists attack the economy first and achieve their ideological aims later (Freyer and Schröder, 2007).

Cultural differences might also be a trigger for terrorists to attack tourists. For example, tourists engaging in behavior that is forbidden in Islam, like eating pork, drinking alcohol and gambling, may provoke attacks by radical Islamic groups that see such behavior as a threat to their traditions and value system.

In a number of cases, the actual targets of terrorist acts are not the unfortunate tourists caught in the crossfire, but rather the general social system, the government or the political order. Tourists are either an indirect means to reach those ends or merely collateral damage (incidental victims). Of course, there are extreme cases of terror attacks against tourists and tourist facilities in which the violence can be understood as a message, aimed to alarm the general public on a local, national, and international scale through the mass media.³

Scott has argued that linkages between terrorism and tourism would not exist in the absence of media attention. In his paper "Media congestion limits media terrorism," he found empirical linkages between terrorism and tourism (Scott, 2001).

In today's media world, most people first hear of a major terrorist incident through the media (TV, radio, newspapers or Internet). For these omnipresent media, terrorist acts contain the very essence of hard news because they:

- involve ordinary people who have become victims and with whom everyone can identify,
- represent a threat to a lot of people, primarily to the most vulnerable and perhaps valuable (mainly perceived to be children, pregnant women and the elderly), and
- have major, perhaps fatal, long-term consequences.

As a result, the media are, together with the emergency services, the first responders to the spot of a terrorist act, in order to provide the first coverage of a story and to continue to provide ongoing follow-up information.

Usually, media coverage of terrorist attacks is overloaded with emotional overtones. In keeping with the maxim "if it bleeds, it leads," journalists seem to believe that the more a terrorist act can trigger viewers emotions, the more coverage it should get. Inevitably, reporting on such events involves human drama, tension, romance, adventure, tragedy and victims (Glaesser, 2006). These elements, to-

³Between 1985 and 1998, Pizam and Smith counted approximately 70 important terrorist incidents at destinations in which 71% of the victims were tourists (Pizam and Smith, 2000).

gether with others, such as physical and cultural proximity, make up the total news value of the event.⁴


If foreign tourists are victimized in a terrorist act, the situation is instantly magnified by the media, moving a political conflict between terrorists and their government into the spotlight of the international stage. The tourists' countries of origin become involved in the previously domestic discord, and this involvement of other countries intensifies the pressure on the government that the terrorists are targeting. The widespread media attention focused on the object of the terrorists' political viewpoint confirms the tourists' usefulness to the terrorists (Richter, 1983).

In socially constructed reality, the media are major agents in shaping the public's views on risk. Research, however, shows that public attitudes towards the media are often ambivalent -- a blend of attraction and repulsion. While many people value the information, viewpoints and entertainment that the media give them, they are also wary of the power that they feel that the media have over them. The degree of cynicism that the public have for some of the media means that the effects of sensationalist reporting are not inevitable. The key point is trust; if the public trust the medium, they are likely to treat the messages they receive from it as factually correct (Communicating Risk).

The effects that terrorist attacks have on tourists and media reporting can be direct and indirect. The direct effects are on the victims, their families and other people more or less involved or concerned. Potentially more damaging is the impact of any indirect effects. A high number of ongoing media updates repeating the disturbing images can amplify the effects of a terrorist act and produce a fundamental crisis of confidence in the safety of a tourist destination and the competence of the country's security system. They can influence the risk perception of a potential tourist and his/her decision about where to spend the holidays. As other have noted, risk perception is not a matter of pure knowledge or precise calculation, but rather a complex process including a number of psychological, emotional and irrational factors. Although terrorist attacks on tourists are relatively rare events, media reporting can influence the public's risk perception and its associated willingness to travel (Hoffman, 1999).⁵

⁴ For example, Beirman has argued that the Philippines has suffered from terrorism since the early 1990s but only "attacks against foreign tourists have raised the media profile of this problem" (Beirman, 2006:254). *If one's fellow countrymen are victims of terror attacks, one's sense of vulnerability increases.*

⁵ The renowned tourism author Rick Steves has noted that the odds of being killed by a terrorist overseas or in the air are 1 in 2,200,000, while the odds of being struck by lightning are 1 in 600,000 and the odds of being killed by gunfire in the United States are 1 in 18,900 (Rick Steves Talks About Safe Travel on <http://www.ricksteves.com/about/pressroom/qa.htm>) (last visited on February 10, 2010).



In the integrated decisionmaking model proposed by Sönmez and Graefe, media coverage of terrorism and/or other acts that are indicative of political instability is the first among external factors that shape risk perception and, in the last stage of decisionmaking, influence an individual's decision whether to travel to a particular location. Media are the most important agents in disseminating information about the level of security and likelihood of terrorism at or near a chosen vacation region or destination (Sönmez and Graefe,1998:124).

In an ideal world, media reports should enable the public to make competent and responsible decisions about risks. In reality, journalistic selection of topics, themes, and information for the broadest public interest may distort the actual situation and create a false public perception of risk (Meier and Schanne, 1996). These conditions contribute to trip cancellations and declining demand at destinations and regions that are actually safe and unaffected by terror attacks. One result of the intense coverage of terrorist activities that may be linked to tourism can be a substantial short-term fall in demand for tourism in the affected destination. Above all, frivolous coverage can lead to mid- and long-term negative public attitudes regarding the riskiness of a destination, as well as its associated image, thereby further jeopardizing tourism demand. Even after booking a trip, negative information may still alter a decision, leading to a cancelled trip.

For example, in the early 1990s, German media coverage of Egypt created the impression that the entire country was affected by fundamentalist terror attacks, even though an official statement from the head of the Egyptian tourist office declared that only the area around Assiut was considered dangerous (Schreier, 1994). Another example arose during the social turmoil in Havana in August 1994, when


about 10,000 people engaged in peaceful demonstrations and counter-demonstrations. Some media reports on these events were completely exaggerated, leading to a considerable number of cancellations of trips to Cuba (Chierek, 1995).

Media coverage of terrorism or political upheaval has the potential to shape the image that viewers have of particular destinations. Terrorism has a dangerous potential for a place's image, and many places seek a real solution to avoid possible crises and prevent future attacks. (Avraham and Ketter, 2008:143).

Media coverage of terrorist events has an especially powerful potential influence because media coverage is frequently the only source of information on an issue available to the audience. Media coverage is not only frequently a unique source of information but it may also be a unique source of interpretation. In particular, the general public is apt to rely to an enormous degree on media accounts for an understanding of terrorists' motives, the implications of their actions, and the essential character of the situation (Weimann and Winn, 1994:154).

The effects of media coverage can spread from the tourist place affected to the whole country or even region.

The research reports of the Institute Medien Tenor demonstrate how media coverage can negatively affect the demand for tourism. For one year beginning in January 1998, German television stations reported on hotspots in Israel in every other story. Around eighty percent of those reports dealt with international crises and terrorism. From September 2000 to August 2001, there was a similar number of stories in the German media, and every fourth story was negative. Eighty-eight percent of the stories about Israel in the United States media were about terrorist incidents, and two-thirds were negatively portrayed (Medien Tenor, 2001).



Source: Forschungsgemeinschaft Urlaub und Reisen (2003).

The receipt of information about the risks of terrorism at the destination or involving the type of transportation that they intend to use can have a decisive influence on potential tourists and their decisions to travel, potentially inducing them to substitute a safer alternative in lieu of the originally planned destination. Relevant studies have shown that tourists substitute safer choices for risky destinations, demonstrate a delayed reaction to terrorism and exhibit cultural differences in their reactions to risk. Despite their low probability, risks carrying high costs, such as terrorism, appear to provoke serious consumer reaction. For example, in 1986, 1.8 million Americans changed their foreign travel plans as a result of terrorist activities in 1985 (Sonmez and Graefe, 1998).

The perception and labeling by the public of a specific destination as unsafe results in a drop of the number of stays, especially for wealthier tourists, who more readily have the opportunity to travel to alternate tourist locations, regions or countries. It has been estimated that the Islamic extremist terrorist attack in Luxor in 1997 cost Egypt approximately 50% of its annual tourist turnover (Glaeser, 2003:48).

While terrorism research indicates that the initial effects of terror attacks are severe, it also indicates that, after only a few months, terrorist incidents are forgotten and the negative influence on the public diminishes. According to Fleischer and Buccola, the impact of terrorist attacks on tourists lasts an average of two months, but, over a longer period, an event's psychological effect appears to subside (Fleischer and Buccola 2002:1339). Of course, if additional negative events occur, the public's negative attitude will persist longer.

Risk perception is not the only factor that influences the decisionmaking process of a prospective tourist. There are a number of important external (government issued travel advisories; social interactions regarding terrorism and/or political instability), internal (international travel experience and attitudes; the traveler's personality type) and demographic (age; gender; income; education; children in the household) factors that influence the motivation and decision to travel (Sönmez and Graefe, 1998).

The Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center clearly demonstrate the potential risk that terrorism poses for the tourism industry. The events of 9/11 in the United States, together with the 2003 war in Iraq and the outbreak of SARS and other epidemics, greatly affected the tourism industry. According to the Travel Industry Association of America ("TIA"), since 2000, domestic and international travel expenditures declined by more than twenty-nine trillion dollars in 2001 (Travel Industry Association of America, 2002). The impact of the events of 9/11 were particularly severe in the United States, where the society has become more skeptical, suspicious and watchful (Chura, 2002). According to the TIA, travelers are also experiencing a certain degree of uncertainty and continue to be more cautious in their planning (Amarante, 2003).

Crisis management strategies

Because tourist destinations are vulnerable to politically motivated violence, Sönmez, Apostolopoulos and Tarlow suggest that tourist managers should incorporate crisis management planning into their overall sustainable development and marketing/management strategies to protect and rebuild their image of safety/attractiveness, to reassure potential visitors of the safety of the area, to reestablish the area's functionality/attractiveness, and to aid local travel and tourism industry members in their economic recovery. Their recommendations include having a crisis management plan in place, establishing a tourism crisis management task force, developing a crisis management guide book, and partnering with law enforcement officials (Sönmez, Apostolopoulos and Tarlow:1999).

Yoel Mansfeld has devised some generally applicable advice, based on the Israeli experience, for the recovery of a tourism industry. Marketing activities should be dynamic and constantly innovative, but also sensitive to various crisis scenarios. Messages regarding security and safety must be spelled out in a realistic manner. In the midst of a given severe and ongoing security situation, all marketing campaigns aimed at international tourism must be stopped as their continuation would waste resources and credibility. An country affected by terrorism should maintain a constant flow of comprehensive information about its level of security and safety as a travel destination. These data also need to be available at all times through communications channels accessible by the generating markets (newspapers, special television travel programs, the Internet, travel magazines, etc.) (Mansfeld, 1999).

Tourist destinations affected by terrorism cannot ignore a crisis by trying to portray it as insignificant, irrelevant and marginal. Decisionmakers often implement this technique of attempting to downplay a crisis when the media demand explanations or reactions. For example, after a terror attack in Djerbe, Tunisia, an official said, "There is no terrorism in Tunisia! Why do you always focus on that?" He added that only one synagogue was attacked and that "it is not the end of the world" (<http://www.themedialine.org>). An Egyptian official had a similar reaction after a suicide bomber attack in Cairo, when he tried to convince the media that the terrorist had acted alone and was not part of a new terror network (*Ha'aretz*, 10 April 2005).

Some countries have implemented specific, tailor-made strategies after terrorist attacks. A terror attack in Tunisia in 2002 near a local synagogue exerted a marked adverse effect on tourism from Israel. Perceiving Israelis as an important target market, the Tunisian government formulated new regulations to enhance the sense of security and to make visits by Israeli tourists safer and easier. These measures included local police escorts for organized groups (*Ha'aretz*, 1 Jan. 2005). Likewise, following a terrorist attack against German tourists, the Egyptian government took a hard line against radical Islamic groups to reduce the likelihood of possible future crises (Wahab, 1996). Both Tunisia and Egypt tried to cope with their image crises

indirectly by addressing the problems that caused them. Egypt has tried to deal with its terrorism problem by increasing security and aggressively marketing and promoting its efforts. The Egyptian police have adopted preventive and proactive measures that eventually helped them find and arrest terrorist leaders (Wahab, 1996). Mexico lowered its prices for tourist destinations and engaged in an aggressive marketing campaign (Pitts, 1996), while Northern Ireland tried to increase tourism by developing new tourism products and attractions supported by heavy promotions (Witt and Moore 1992). Maintaining good contacts with members of the international media; providing comprehensive information to international tour operators, travel agents, and the press (to evaluate travel risks in their proper context); and wisely guiding tourists away from high-risk areas are also strategies for crisis management (Wahab, 1996).

Concluding remarks

Terrorism has become a global phenomenon, and tourist destinations and the tourists that visit them are high on the scale of possible terrorist targets. Because security is an important element of the tourism industry, the threat potential of international terrorism must be taken seriously in every country, not only those that so far have had experiences with terrorism. The influence of terrorist events, amplified through media reports, on the tourism industry should not be underestimated. Managers in the tourism industry, in cooperation with a wide range of actors, including regional security agencies, emergency service providers, the media and NGOs, should be proactive in developing and implementing comprehensive integrated crisis management plans to reduce the risk and influence of serious adversity. Crisis communication has to be an integral part of these plans, as the tourism industry relies on its positive image.

There are no universal recipes that can be taken from a "cookbook" and implemented after a terrorist attack has occurred in order to reestablish the image of an affected tourist destination and regain the confidence of vacationers. Although all terrorist attacks have a number of common features, every one is a unique event. In the case of each terrorist attack targeting a tourist destination or tourists, all the relevant circumstances (the stakeholders, short- and long-term consequences, side effects, etc.) should be closely analyzed in order to choose the most appropriate public relations strategy to regain the undermined image and lost international reputation.

General rules and recommendations in crisis communication have to be followed by the tourist industry when dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks. Honesty, transparency, professionalism, sensitivity and compassion for victims and good communications with the public and media can improve the chances of a speedy recovery. It is very important to pass on information about the type of threat to tourism-related industries (hotels, transportation, etc.) and to instruct international tour operators and travel agents about the possible dangers. Com-

munications releases based on knowledge and understanding of the market should be composed and sent.

After the terrorist attacks in Bali, the World Tourism Organization recommended that proactive strategies for future crisis communication and preparedness planning include the development of a dedicated public relations office, the establishment of a specific media response protocol, the formation of a representative consultative body and the development of a basic resource allocation (Gurtner, 2007:87).

The communication of risk is no easy task, but risk assessment and communication should at least be part of the policy discussion about terrorism, which may well prove to be a far smaller danger than is popularly portrayed. The constant, un-nuanced stoking of fear by politicians and the media is costly, enervating, potentially counterproductive, and unjustified by the facts (Mueller, 2004).

The tragedy of 9/11 has caused communication managers to rethink everything that they do. Lisa Fall has noted that "messages are constantly being restructured, communication channels are being retooled, and key publics are being retargeted" (Fall, 2004). The post-9/11 terrorist attacks demand that communications programs be elaborately yet strategically revamped. One cannot assume that programs that were successful before 9/11 will continue to be appropriate now. No "cookie cutter" formulas or "how-to" crisis manuals can be used for such a rare and uncharted circumstance (Fall, 2004). New circumstances require not only communication skills and broad crisis communication knowledge, but creativity, courage and innovation.

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